Rahiem Nowell v. John Reilly by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-22-2011 
Rahiem Nowell v. John Reilly 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Rahiem Nowell v. John Reilly" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1058. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1058 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 10-2125 
____________ 
 
RAHIEM NOWELL,  
                                                         Appellant 
v. 
 
JOHN A. REILLY, ESQUIRE, SUPERINTENDENT, ET AL; 
PHILLIP CARTER, SGT.; MARIO COLUCCI, OFFICER;  
DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 09-cv-01569) 
District Judge:  Honorable Luis Felipe Restrepo 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 20, 2011 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges  
and RESTANI 
*
 Judge. 
 
(Filed: June 22, 2011) 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Rahiem Nowell appeals a summary judgment of the District Court in favor of 
                                                 
 *The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International 
Trade, sitting by designation. 
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Delaware County, Pennsylvania (the County) and John A. Reilly, Superintendent of the 
George W. Hill Correctional Facility (GWHCF).  Nowell also appeals two discovery 
orders of the District Court.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts and procedural 
history. 
Nowell alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of his time spent at 
GWHCF as a pretrial detainee.  In addition to his claims against the County and Reilly 
that form the basis of this appeal, Nowell brought claims against Deputy Warden Mario 
Colucci and Sergeant Phillip Carter, which were tried to a jury.  Because Nowell appeals 
the summary judgment entered in favor of the County and Reilly, not the judgments in 
favor of Colucci and Carter, we review the facts in the light most favorable to Nowell. 
 In January 2008, Nowell was incarcerated at GWHCF while he awaited trial on 
narcotics charges.  At all relevant times, GWHCF was run by The GEO Group, Inc. 
(GEO), the private contractor hired by the County to administer the prison.  On November 
3, 2008, after hearing that inmates intended to harm him, Nowell gave a note to Sergeant 
Carter stating: “I fear for my life and I would like to be moved to another unit.  There are 
people plotting to stab me up, please move me right now, thank you!”  When he received 
no response, Nowell filed two grievances restating his fears on November 4 and 
November 14, 2008.  On November 20, 2008, Nowell‟s throat was cut by another inmate; 
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Nowell went to his cell, wrapped a towel around his neck, and was taken by guards for 
medical attention.  Nevertheless, Nowell told the guards and the medical staff that he had 
suffered a seizure while shaving and had cut himself.  He later completed a written 
statement to that effect. 
 Nowell was taken from the medical unit at GWHCF to Riddle Memorial Hospital 
in Media, Pennsylvania, where he was given numerous stitches and prescribed an 
antibiotic and pain medicine.  When he was returned to GWHCF, the prison gave him a 
different antibiotic and pain medication.  On November 24, 2008, Nowell filed two more 
grievances, one complaining that he had been denied his medication and one complaining 
that prison officials caused his injury by not moving him from his cell block, despite his 
requests. 
 On April 13, 2009, Nowell filed a complaint in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  During the discovery period, Nowell repeatedly 
amended his complaint before filing a third amended complaint on October 1, 2009.  
Nowell sought $10,300,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive 
damages and alleged four violations of his substantive due process rights based on: (1) 
Defendants‟ deliberate indifference to his grievances before he was attacked; (2) 
Defendants‟ refusal to administer the medication prescribed by the Riddle Memorial 
Hospital physician; (3) Carter‟s conduct during the search of Nowell‟s person on another 
occasion; and (4) Defendants‟ failure to fully investigate the circumstances of the attack.  
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Defendants moved for summary judgment, and on November 23, 2009, the District Court 
granted Reilly‟s and the County‟s motions, but denied Colucci‟s and Carter‟s motions. 
 Some five months before the District Court entered summary judgment for Reilly 
and the County, the Court ordered all fact discovery to be completed by September 11, 
2009.  Nowell first served interrogatories and requests for production of documents on 
August 24, 2009, only nineteen days before the close of discovery.  On the last day of 
discovery, Defendants responded to Nowell‟s request with a general objection based on 
the tardiness of the interrogatories and requests for production, as well as with specific, 
albeit boilerplate, objections to each.  They provided no documents or answers to 
interrogatories.  Twenty days later, Nowell filed a motion to compel, which the Court 
denied on October 13, 2009.  Nowell then moved to reopen discovery, but that motion 
was denied on October 30, 2009. 
 The case proceeded to a jury trial against Carter and Colucci.  After the close of 
Nowell‟s case-in-chief, the Court granted Colucci‟s Rule 50 motion, dismissing all counts 
against him.  The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Carter. 
 Nowell timely appealed the October 13 and October 30, 2009 discovery orders and 
the summary judgment in favor of the County and Reilly.
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II 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because 
Nowell‟s third amended complaint raised federal questions and alleged civil rights 
violations.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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“We review discovery orders under an abuse of discretion standard.”  Mass. Sch. 
of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997).  When 
appealing discovery orders, “[a]ppellants have a heavy burden to bear . . . as matters of 
docket control and conduct of discovery are committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court.”  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Lit., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).  “[W]e 
will not upset a district court‟s conduct of discovery procedures absent a demonstration 
that the court‟s action made it impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and implicit in such 
a showing is proof that more diligent discovery was impossible.”  Id. at 818 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b) provides that the “party to whom the 
[discovery] request is directed must respond in writing within 30 days after being served. 
A shorter or longer time may be stipulated to under Rule 29 or be ordered by the court.”  
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(A). 
 By propounding his discovery requests and interrogatories only nineteen days 
before the close of discovery, Nowell did not provide Defendants with the thirty days to 
which they were entitled under Rule 34(b)(2)(A).  In his motions to the District Court, 
Nowell provided no “proof [or even argument] that more diligent discovery was 
impossible.”  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Lit., 685 F.2d at 818.  Upon receiving 
Defendants‟ objections, Nowell waited 20 days before speaking to Defendants‟ counsel 
by telephone and learning that Defendants stood by their objections.  See Nowell v. Reilly, 
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No. 09-1569 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2009), ECF No. 29 at 3.  Only then did Nowell file his 
motion to compel.  Nor did Nowell explain in his motion to reopen discovery—which 
was filed two weeks after the District Court denied his motion to compel—why he could 
not have been more diligent.  See Nowell v. Reilly, No. 09-1569 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2009), 
ECF No. 36.  On this record, we find no grounds upon which to conclude that the District 
Court abused its discretion by denying Nowell‟s discovery motions. 
III 
We turn to Nowell‟s challenge to the District Court‟s summary judgments in favor 
of Reilly and the County, which we review de novo.  Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. Hosp., 
423 F.3d 318, 322 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005).  We “apply the same test required of the district 
court” and resolve all questions of fact in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Nowell claims that the County and Reilly were liable for the allegedly deficient 
medical care he received (Count 2), and that Reilly was liable as a supervisor for Carter‟s 
allegedly inadequate response to Nowell‟s written warnings of the attack (Counts 1 and 
4).
2 
 Although the District Court did not explain its order granting summary judgment, the 
entry of summary judgment on these claims is hardly surprising, given the nature of the 
claims and Nowell‟s insufficient discovery.  The claims all rely on secondary theories of 
                                                 
2 Nowell‟s complaint is written broadly and could be read to allege violations by 
all Defendants at every count.  Because these are the only claims he presses on appeal, 
however, all others are waived.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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liability because Nowell does not allege that the County or Reilly directly violated his 
rights. 
Nowell‟s § 1983 claims against the County arise under Monell, which requires 
proof that his injury was caused by “„action pursuant to official municipal policy[,]‟” 
which “includes the decisions of a government‟s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking 
officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of 
law.”  Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (quoting Monell v. Dept. of 
Soc. Svcs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)); see also Brown v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Nowell argues that the prison physicians were acting pursuant to a County policy 
or practice not to honor prescriptions written by outside physicians.  He relies on the 
following statement by a prison grievance officer: “The physicians at the jail are under no 
obligation to honor prescriptions written outside of the jail.  You were given a different 
antibiotic and pain medication.”  Nowell interprets this to mean that the County policy 
and practice were to ignore outside prescriptions, which, he argues, is “a complete 
misstatement of the correct official policy.”  Nonetheless, he speculates that “the conduct 
of prison physicians unquestionably represented the edict of Appellee Delaware County.” 
 In fact, the evidence adduced at summary judgment shows that the official policy was for 
prison physicians to consider outside prescriptions and to make independent 
determinations of prisoners‟ medical needs.  That policy is consistent with both the 
8 
 
grievance officer‟s statement and the treatment that Nowell actually received.  Nowell 
provides no evidence to suggest that the prison physicians, the grievance officer, or GEO 
were acting pursuant to any other County policy, practice, or “edict.”  His speculation that 
they were does not raise a question of fact; it is no more than an argument for respondeat 
superior liability, which cannot sustain a claim under Monell.  Monell, 436 U.S at 691; 
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). 
Nowell‟s § 1983 claims against Reilly fare no better.  These claims require a 
showing that Reilly “participated in violating [Nowell‟s] rights, or that he directed others 
to violate them, or that he, as the person in charge . . . had knowledge of and acquiesced 
in his subordinates‟ violations.”  Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 231 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)).  A “„person‟ is 
not the „moving force [behind] the constitutional violation‟ of a subordinate, unless that 
„person‟—whether a natural one or a municipality—has exhibited deliberate indifference 
to the plight of the person deprived.”  Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 
1989) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)) (citation omitted). 
As with his claim against the County, Nowell has produced no evidence that Reilly 
participated in Nowell‟s allegedly deficient healthcare, directed others in that care, or 
even knew of it.  Nor has he adduced evidence of deliberate indifference or knowledge of 
past similar incidents on Reilly‟s part.  See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361.  Nowell‟s 
conclusory allegation that there was a deficient “procedure, applied under the direction of 
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the Appellee Reilly, the prison superintendent” is insufficient to raise a question of fact 
and is not enough to establish supervisory liability under § 1983. 
 Finally, Nowell also failed to raise a question of fact as to Reilly‟s supervisory 
liability for Carter‟s deliberate indifference to Nowell‟s warnings.  Although the jury 
subsequently found that Carter had not violated Nowell‟s rights, which would naturally 
preclude any supervisory liability, on review of summary judgment we must construe the 
facts in Nowell‟s favor.  See Groman, 47 F.3d at 633.  Even under that favorable 
standard, the record is devoid of evidence that Reilly was aware of any warnings before 
the attack.  Thus, Nowell has failed to show that Reilly “participated in violating 
[Nowell‟s] rights, or . . . directed others to violate them, or . . . had knowledge of and 
acquiesced in his subordinates‟ violations.”  Reedy, 615 F.3d at 231 (quoting Baker, 50 
F.3d at 1190-91).  To the extent that Nowell‟s argument relies on his claim that Reilly did 
not sufficiently investigate Nowell‟s grievance against Carter after the attack, Nowell 
fails to explain how this amounts to a constitutional violation, and he also fails to adduce 
any evidence suggesting that any investigation was, in fact, inadequate. 
V 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in all 
respects. 
